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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was projected to raise corporate taxes by
more than $120 billion over the 1986 to 1991 period. Actual federal
corporate tax receipts in the last five years have fallen far short of these
projections. This paper explores the factors that have contributed to
this shortfall. The most important factor is lower-than-expected corpo-
rate profits. The underperformance of corporate profits can be attrib-
uted to three principal causes. First, the predicted rates of corporate
profits when the 1986 Tax Reform Act was enacted were high by histori-
cal standards. The total returns on corporate capital in the U.S. econ-
omy in the late 1980s were not as high as the pre-1986 forecasts which
underlay initial revenue projections. Second, corporate interest pay-
ments were significantly higher, as a share of corporate operating in-
come or GNP, in the late 1980s than in the years leading up to the Tax
Reform Act. This reduced the corporate tax base, and may in substan-
tial part ultimately be attributable to the marginal incentive effects for
debt and equity finance provided in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Third,
also quite likely in reaction to recent tax changes, the last few years
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have seen rapid growth in the income reported by Subchapter S corpora-
tions. This income is taxed under the individual income tax. The rise of S
corporations has, therefore, contributed to the erosion of the corporate
income tax.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was forecast to raise corporate taxes by
nearly $120 billion between 1986 and 1991. Actual corporate tax receipts
have fallen below projections in each of these years. In February 1987,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast federal corporate tax
collections of $138 billion for fiscal year 1990. Actual receipts were $94
billion. The corporate tax shortfall has exacerbated the federal deficit and
raised fundamental questions about the long-term revenue potential of
the corporate income tax.
This paper examines the reasons for the corporate tax shortfall. The
paper is divided into five sections. The first summarizes the predicted
effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the actual pattern of corporate
tax collections in the last five years. It shows that TRA86 did raise federal
corporate tax collections relative to what they would have been other-
wise, but that a decline in corporate profits relative to their predicted
level depressed corporate tax receipts.
Section II examines the source of the decline in corporate profits in
more detail, identifying a component due to a reduction in the total
return to capital, and a component due to an increase in the fraction of
corporate earnings paid out as interest. Higher interest charges are the
most important factor in the late-1980s decline in corporate profits. If
corporate leverage had been constant at its 1986 level relative to earn-
ings, then cumulative corporate tax receipts over the 1987 to 1991 period
would have been $42 billion (1991) dollars above their actual level.
Section III analyzes another post-1986 trend that has contributed to the
corporate tax shortfall: The shift from C to S corporations. This shift
accounts for a significant decline in corporate taxes, particularly in 1990
and 1991. This shift may in large part be the result of changes in the
relative tax rates on individuals and corporations in the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, notably the introduction of a top tax rate on individuals below that
on corporations.
The fourth section analyzes how the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affected
the effective tax rate on corporate capital, and what accounts for dispari-
ties between the statutory and effective rate. This section employs a
methodology developed in Auerbach and Poterba (1987) to analyze the
1986 changes in the structure of corporate taxation. The conclusion specu-
lates about the future revenue prospects of the corporate income tax.The Tax Reform Act of 1986 45
I. CORPORATE TAX RECEIPTS, 1959-1990
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) raised corporate taxes in the year when
it was enacted, and it was projected to increase corporate taxes for the
remainder of the 1980s.1 TRA reduced the statutory tax rate on corpo-
rate taxable income, but more than compensated for the associated
revenue loss by eliminating the investment tax credit, lengthening de-
preciation lifetimes for many assets, and adopting a variety of other
base-broadeners. Table 1 shows the forecasts made by the Congres-
sional Budget Office in their Economic and Budget Outlook each February,
as well as the actual pattern of corporate tax recepits. Actual revenues
have fallen below projections, even one year ahead, in every year since
1986. The revenue shortfall began in 1987, widened in 1988, and then
rose sharply in 1990 when actual revenues fell below 1989 collections.
The table shows that the revenue shortfall is more than a failure of the
TRA to increase revenues as predicted. In each fiscal year since 1987,
actual tax receipts fell below the CBO's projections from before the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 was enacted.2
There are two differences between the forecasts in early 1986 and
those in early 1987, the passage of the Tax Reform Act, and changes in
forecasts of corporate profits. Corporate profits are defined in this discus-
sion as economic profits, which equals reported profits with corrections
for the inventory valuation adjustment and the capital consumption
adjustment.3 Table 2 shows the projected share of corporate profits in
GNP in early 1986, and early 1987, as well as the actual values for calen-
dar years 1987 to 1991. The CBO's forecast prior to the passage of TRA86
assumed that corporate profits would average more than 8 percent of
GNP for the 1987 to 1991 period. One year later, projected corporate
profits were much lower, averaging 7.2 percent of GNP. This downward
revision reduced the projected level of corporate taxes. The last column
of Table 2 shows that actual corporate profits averaged just over 6 per-
1 One important component of the Tax Reform Act was a lengthening of depreciation life
times. Longer asset lives raise taxes in the near term but reduce them in future years, when
assets that would otherwise have been fuliy depreciated are still generating deductions.
2 The corporate tax shortfall has attracted attention from tax policy makers. The U.S.
Senate Committee on Finance (1990) held hearings to assess the reasons for the shortfall.
Testimony presented at the hearings discusses the explanations for the profit decline that
are developed in this paper as well as other possibilities.
The WA removes spurious profits due to changes in the value of inventories and work-
in-progress from the profit concept, while the CCA corrects accounting depreciation to
reflect economic depreciation measured at replacement cost.46Poterba
TABLE 1.
Forecast and Actual Federal Corporate Tax Receipts, FY 1986-1991.
Source: Column 1 is drawn from the Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook:
January 1991, Table D-4. Column 2 is from the February 1986 CBO publication The Economic and Budget
Outlook. Other columns are from intervening CBO publications dated as shown.
cent of GNP between 1987 and 1991, declining from 6.8 percent in 1987
to just over 5 percent in the first half of 1991.
The decline in corporate profits explains a large fraction of the corpo-
rate tax shortfall. Applying a marginal tax rate of 34 percent to profits to
compute federal corporate tax receipts would suggest that a 1.7 percent
of GNP decline in corporate profits, the difference between the January
1987 CBO forecast and actual profits for calendar 1991, would reduce
corporate taxes by approximately 0.6 percent of GNP. The actual differ-
ence between the CBO's 1987 forecast and actual 1990 receipts was 0.8
TABLE 2.
Forecast and Actual Corporate Profits! GNP, CY 1987-1991.
Source: Column 1 is drawn from the Congressional Budget Office, Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal -
Years 1987-1991 (February 1986), the second column from the similar publication dated January 1991,
and the final column from the National Income and Product Accounts. The starred entry for 1991 is







Projected receipts as of:
2/88 1/89 1/90 1/91
1987 84 89 101
1988 94 100 119 99
1989 103 108 126 107 103
1990 94 112 138 119 112 102
1991 98* 114 151 126 120 111 99
1987 1.9 2.0 2.3
1988 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.1
1989 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.0
1990 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9
1991 1.8 1.9 2.6 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8
Year Forecast 2/86 Forecast 1/87 Actual
1987 8.1 7.2% 6.8
1988 8.2 7.1 6.9
1989 8.2 7.1 6.0
1990 8.1 7.2 5.5
1991 7.9 7.2 5.1*The Tax Reform Act of 198647
percent of GNP. This preliminary calculation thus suggests that changes
in corporate profitability have been a key factor in the reduction in
corporate taxes.
II. WHY HAVE CORPORATE PROFITS FALLEN?
Profits vary as a result of fluctuations in operating earnings or because of
changes in the share of earnings paid out as interest. The two sources of
profit shocks imply different interpretations of a reduction in corporate
taxes as a result of a profit decline. If the total returns from capital
decline, then a decline in corporate profits coincide with a decline in the
total revenue that can be collected from the corporate sector. If, how-
ever, the profit decline is the result of higher interest payments, then the
decline in corporate taxes will be offset in part by higher tax collections
on interest recipients.
Table 3 presents summary data on the role of interest payments and
declining operating profits in explaining the decline in corporate profits.
The first column displays corporate profits as a percentage of GNP,
while the second shows corporate capital income, the sum of profits and
interest payments, to GNP. Corporate capital income as a share of GNP
has remained relatively stable, averaging 8.4 percent over the last five
years, while corporate profits have declined from 6.7 percent in 1986 to
5.5 percent in 1991. This reflects the increase in the share of corporate
capital income distributed as interest: 18.6 percent in 1986 and 32.4 per-
cent in 1991. Corporate interest payments as a share of GNP rose from
1.5 percent (1986) to 2.6 percent (1990) during this period.
The rise in interest payout is due primarily to changes in corporate
leverage. Nominal interest rates were somewhat higher in 1990 than in
1986, but not by enough to explain the rise in the interest payout ratio in
Table 34 Between 1986 and 1990, however, U.S. nonfinancial corpora-
tions repurchased $476 billion of corporate equity, and issued $758 bil-
lion of debt. Share repurchases peaked in 1988, when these firms bought
back shares worth $130 billion. This pattern of equity repurchase by
nonfinancial firms has attracted widespread attention, but it is only
partly responsible for the increase in interest payouts from U.S. corpora-
tions. Approximately two-thirds of the increase in net interest payments
is concentrated among financial firms.
The nominal interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds averaged 7.68% in 1986, compared
with 8.55% in 1990. The differential is a measure of the shift in the structure of interest
rates affecting corporate borrowers.48Poterba
TABLE 3.
Corporate Operating Income and Profits, 1960-1990.
Source: National Income and Product Accounts.
Until the mid-1980s, U.S. firms typically issued a small amount of
equity each year. The shift in financial policy is at least in part attribut-
able to the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms. Table 4 shows the net-of-tax
returns individual investors in debt and equity could earn in various
years since 1980. The table follows the tradition of Merton Miller's(1977)
focus on the after-tax returns to investors at the top of the income distri-
Year (Profits + Interest)/GNP InterestlGNP Profits/GNP
1960 9.6 0.0 9.6
1961 9.4 0.0 9.4
1962 10.2 0.0 10.1
1963 10.6 0.1 10.5
1964 10.9 0.1 10.9
1965 11.7 0.2 11.5
1966 11.6 0.4 11.2
1967 10.8 0.5 10.3
1968 10.7 0.5 10.2
1969 9.9 0.8 9.1
1970 8.4 1.1 7.4
1971 8.9 1.0 7.9
1972 9.2 0.9 8.3
1973 9.2 0.9 8.3
1974 8.2 1.3 6.9
1975 8.6 1.3 7.4
1976 9.0 0.9 8.1
1977 9.8 1.0 8.8
1978 9.9 1.1 8.8
1979 9.4 1.4 8.0
1980 8.4 1.9 6.5
1981 8.2 2.1 6.2
1982 6.9 2.2 4.7
1983 8.2 1.9 6.3
1984 8.9 1.8 7.1
1985 8.7 1.7 7.0
1986 8.2 1.5 6.7
1987 8.5 1.7 6.8
1988 8.6 1.7 6.9
1989 8.4 2.4 6.0
1990 8.0 2.6 5.5
1960-69 10.5 0.3 10.2
1970-79 8.2 1.0 7.2
1980-85 8.2 1.9 6.3
1986-90 8.3 2.0 6.3The Tax Reform Act of 198649
TABLE 4.
Tax Incentives for Corporate Leverage, 1975-1990.
Source: Author's calculations. The first column reports (1 - mw), where m denotes the marginal federal
income tax rate on interest income received by the highest income individual investors. The second
column reports (1 - - .5m .5r) where denotes the statutoly corporate tax rate and
the effective capital gains tax rate, definecas .25 times the statutory capital gains tax rate facing realizeä
gains for top-bracket households. The .25 factor reflects the reduction in the effective tax rate as a result
of deferral and basis step-up at death.
bution. The after-tax return on debt is (1 - Tmax), where Tmax is the per-
sonal income tax rate on an individual facing the top marginal tax rate.
The after-tax equity return is (1 - To)*(A(1 - TthV) + (1 - A)(1- Tcg)),
reflecting both the corporate tax burden and the effect of shareholder
taxes on dividends and capital gains.
Table 4 shows the sharp increase in the relative return on debt as
opposed to equity finance. In 1980, the after-tax equity return for top
bracket investors was significantly higher than that from investments in
debt. This pattern was reversed by the end of the decade, when sharp
reductions in the individual top marginal rate made the debt return more
attractive than the equity return.5
When corporate profits decline because of higher interest payout, the
net effect on federal revenue depends on the marginal tax rate of the
interest recipient. It is difficult to measure the net revenue cost of higher
interest payout, because this requires information on the tax brackets of
these recipients. On average, as Gordon and Slemrod (1988) argue, inter-
est is received by taxpayers with lower marginal tax rates than the inter-
est payers. If the recipients are tax-exempt institutions, then the revenue
cost is the full amount of the foregone corporate income taxes. If, how-
ever, the recipients are households, with an average marginal tax rate on
interest income of more than 20 percent, then the net revenue cost of
higher corporate interest payments are much smaller.
The tax incentives for debt versus equity finance are sensitive to assumptions about the
investor's identity. For tax-exempt institutions, for example, the return to debt has been
constant throughout the 1980s, while the return to equity has increased as a result of
reductions in the corporate tax rate.
1975 .30 .315 .015
1980 .30 .332 .032
1985 .50 .392 - .108
1990 .72 .545 - .175
After-Tax After-Tax Equity - Debt
Year Return on Debt Return on Equity Differential50Poterba
III. THE RISE OF SUBCHAPTER S STATUS
Another factor that has affected the level of corporate profits, particu-
larly in the last two years, is the channelling of some income that would
have been corporate before 1986 into noncorporate form. Many enter-
prises have some flexibility in choosing whether to incorporate, and to
pay taxes as a C corporation, or to face the individual income tax code as
an S corporation. C corporate income is taxed once at the corporate rate
and again when it is distributed to shareholders.
Just as the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms altered the relative tax burdens
on debt and equity finance, they altered the incentives for choosing C
versus S corporation status. Gordon and Macide-Mason (1991) and Nel-
son (1991) provide detailed summaries of the somewhat conflicting in-
centives in the recent tax reform. The principal effects are as follows.
First, when the marginal personal tax rate falls relative to the corporate
rate, it becomes more attractive to use Subchapter S status. Because the
1986 tax reform significantly reduced individual tax rates, it should pro-
vide a strong incentive for increased use of S corporations. Second, the
1986 reform repealed the General Utilities doctrine, making it more
costly to hold appreciating assets in corporate form. There are some
offsetting effects that make S status less attractive than C status for some
activities, but the primary effect was to increase the incentive for organiz-
ing S status corporations.
Gordon and Macide-Mason (1991) present preliminary evidence on
the effects of the 1986 tax reform on C versus S corporate status. They
document a sharp increase in S incorporations immediately after the tax
reform, and show that this organizational form has continued to grow
more rapidly in subsequent years. They also observe the difficulty of
using net income reported by S and C corporations as measures of their
relative size, because there are strong incentives for choosing one or the
other organizational form based on whether a particular project is ex-
pected to generate income or losses.
Table 5 reports increase in the amount of income reported by S corpora-
tions during the 1980s. In 1980, S corporations reported only 2 percent as
much income as C corporations. By 1986 this percentage had increased to
5 percent. Actual data are not available for years after 1988, but IRS
projections suggest a continuing sharp increase to 18 percent in 1990. If
the net income projected to be reported by S corporations had been
reported by C corporations in 1990, ordinary corporate income tax re-
ceipts would have been higher by approximately 13 percent. The issue
this table cannot resolve is whether the income that has been reported by
S corporations would otherwise have been reported by C corporations.TABLE 5.
The Rise of S Corporations.
The Tax Reform Act of 198651
Source: Columns 1 and 2 are from author's tabulations from various issues of the SOl Bulletin. Column 3
is the ratio of columns 1 and 2. Column 4 is the product of column 2 and the average tax rate on C
corporate income. Data for 1989 and 1990 are based on IRS projections.
The timing of the rise in S corporate income, and its coincidence with the
change in the tax law, suggests that there has been a shift from C to S
corporate status and that this has reduced reported corporate profits.
Switching productive activities out of the corporate sector reduces
corporate profits, but it also raises the income reported under the per-
sonal income tax. Nelson (1991) presents some evidence on the differ-
ence between the statutory corporate tax rate and the tax rate at which S
corporate income is reported. The net effect of C to S corporate switching
on total federal revenue may be substantially smaller than the estimated
effects on corporate taxes alone.
IV. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES VS. STATUTORY TAX
RATES: THE POST-1986 EXPERIENCE
A central issue in evaluating how an increase in interest payout or a
decrease in profits within the corporate sector will affect revenue is the
choice of the tax rate to apply to foregone profits. One obvious choice is
the maximum statutory marginal rate, currently 34 percent. The diffi-
culty with this choice is that some firms face lower marginal rates, and
some, with loss carryforwards, may face a current marginal tax rate of
zero on incremental earnings. An alternative choice is the effective tax
rate, the average rate that applies to taxable income reported to the IRS.
Year
Net Income/NFC Net Assets Increase in NFC Taxes
if all S Corps were Cs C CorporationsS CorporationsRatio
1980 4.9% 0.1% 0.02 0.04%
1981 4.3 0.1 0.01 0.03
1982 2.8 0.1 0.04 0.03
1983 3.9 0.2 0.04 0.05
1984 5.5 0.2 0.04 0.06
1985 5.7 0.2 0.04 0.06
1986 5.3 0.3 0.05 0.07
1987 5.5 0.7 0.13 0.26
1988 7.1 0.9 0.13 0.28
1989 6.8 1.0 0.15 0.33
1990 6.5 1.2 0.18 0.3752Poterba
This section explores the evolution of the effective tax rate relative to the
statutory tax rate since 1986.
Auerbach and Poterba (1987) computed effective tax rates, compared
them with statutory tax rates, and developed a framework for decompos-
ing the difference between the two. That analysis focused on nonfinan-
cial corporations (NFC5), because these firms were most directly affected
by the tax reforms of 1981 and 1986. To compare the experience of NFCs
with that of the entire corporate sector, Table 6 shows the net corporate
tax payments by NFCs.6 The first column reports the NFC's real corpo-
rate tax payments, while the second and third columns scale these tax
payments by GNP and corporate assets. Tax receipts from NFCs in the
last five years were only slightly higher relative to GNP than in the first
five years of the 1980s, when this share averaged 1.4 percent. The last
column focuses on tax payments divided by net assets. This ratio, which
averaged 4.6 percent during the first five years of the 1960s, was only 2
percent in the late 1980s. Corporate taxes have increased relative to
corporate assets since 1986. For the first five years of the 1980s, NFC tax
payments were on'y 1.5 percent of tangible assets. During the second
half of the decade, they averaged 2.0 percent. In 1986, the Tax Reform
Act was projected to increase tax collections from 2.5 percent to 3.0
percent of corporate assets in 1990.
The detailed decomposition of differences between the statutory and
average effective tax rate is presented in Table 7. The first column shows
the maximum statutory tax rate for each year from 1959 to 1988, the last
year with complete IRS data for performing the analysis. The entries in
the six middle columns describe how various factors have caused the
average tax rate to differ from the statutory rate. Negative entries indi-
cate factors that caused the average tax rate to be less than the statutory
rate, and positive entries correspond to factors that increased the tax
burden above the statutory rate. The average tax rate, taxes/profits, is
reported in the last column. It is the sum of the maximum statutory tax
rate plus the six adjustment factors in the middle columns.
The first source of differences between statutory and average tax rates,
capital recovery provisions that are more or less generous than economic
depreciation, is shown in the second column of Table 7. This column
includes the tax reduction from use of the investment tax credit, as well
as that due to differences between tax depreciation and true economic
depreciation. During the early 1980s, capital recovery provisions ac-
6The table measures tax payments net of refunds obtained by loss carrybacks, including
taxes collected as a result of audits or other retabulations. The appendix to Auerbach and
Poterba (1987) provides a more detailed description.The Tax Reform Act of 198653
TABLE 6.
Federal Corporate Tax Receipts from NFCs, 1960-1990.
Source: Author's tabulations as described in the text.
counted for a 22 percent differential between the statutory and the aver-
age tax rate. This disparity was reduced substantially by the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, which eliminated the investment tax credit and reduced the
generosity of other capital recovery provisions. By 1988, the last year for




NFC taxes as a percentage of:
GNP NFC assets
1960 76.5 3.49 4.33
1961 76.8 3.41 4.31
1962 77.8 3.29 4.37
1963 86.1 3.49 4.81
1964 88.5 3.41 4.86
1965 98.2 3.58 5.28
1966 102.6 3.54 5.30
1967 92.6 3.10 4.53
1968 105.9 3.40 5.06
1969 98.4 3.09 4.53
1970 74.2 2.33 3.31
1971 77.4 2.37 3.40
1972 81.7 2.38 3.50
1973 91.7 2.54 3.79
1974 86.9 2.42 3.19
1975 76.2 2.15 2.56
1976 91.5 2.46 3.01
1977 96.3 2.48 3.10
1978 100.6 2.45 3.04
1979 93.7 2.23 2.62
1980 80.3 1.92 2.09
1981 65.8 1.54 1.63
1982 38.6 0.93 0.95
1983 54.2 1.26 1.34
1984 65.9 1.43 1.63
1985 59.5 1.25 1.49
1986 61.8 1.26 1.58
1987 79.5 1.57 2.05
1988 83.5 1.58 2.15
1989 83.2 1.54 2.18
1990 77.7 1.42 2.04
1960-69 90.3 3.3 4.4
1970-79 87.0 2.3 3.1
1980-85 60.7 1.4 1.3













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1The Tax Reform Act of 198655
rate by only 7.7 percent. This marks a return to roughly the conditions of
the 1960s, when capital recovery reduced the average tax rate by 8.9
percent.
The third column in Table 7 reports the effect of inflation on average
tax rates. This column combines two separate influences. First, inflation
leads to spurious inventory profits that raise corporate tax payments and
the average tax rate.7 Inflation also exerts a countervailing effect on the
average tax rate by reducing the real value of corporate debt, thus gener-
ating capital gains for equity holders. These gains are untaxed, so infla-
tion raises economic income but does not affect taxes. The two effects
roughly cancel, resulting in a small net effect of inflation on the average
tax rate. Inflation raised the average tax rate by less than 1 percent
during the 1970s. It reduced the average tax rate by 2.3 percent during
the 1986 to 1988 period.
The fourth column in Table 7 indicates the impact of imperfect loss
offset provisions on the average tax rate. The principal effect of imperfect
loss offset is to raise the average tax rate when firms experience losses,
because firms with negative income cannot claim tax refunds. Tax re-
ceipts are therefore higher than they would be in a system with propor-
tional taxation of economic income. This effect is somewhat attenuated
by the availability of loss carrybacks and net operating loss carryfor-
wards. Carrybacks allow some loss offset in the year when losses occur.
Loss carryforwards, in contrast, reduce a firm's current tax liability as a
result of previous losses.
Imperfect loss-offset provisions may raise or lower the average tax
rate, depending on whether net operating loss deductions exceed the
value of losses not carried back. The entries in column 7 of Table 4 show
that the impact of loss provisions has declined in the post-1985 period.
By 1988, these considerations raised the average corporate tax rate by
less than 4 percent, while they had averaged a 12.7 percent increase
during the 1982 to 1985 period. Losses had a much greater affect in the
early 1980s than in any other period.
The decline in the incidence of losses since 1986 has contributed to a
reduction in the average corporate tax rate, holding other things con-
stant. While the factors that reduced the prevalence of losses, for exam-
ple the less generous tax depreciation provisions in this period, have
raised corporate taxes, the reduction in losses as a result of these provi-
sions actually blunts their net effect on revenues.
The fifth column of Table 7 describes how foreign tax provisions affect
Inflation's positive impact through a related channel, the failure to index depreciation
allowances for inflation, is subsumed in the capital recovery term.56Poterba
the average tax rate. This term consists of two parts. The first measures
the increase in taxes that would have resulted if foreign source income
were taxable at the U.S. statutory rate, and the second reduces taxes by
the amount of foreign tax credits claimed. If the statutory tax rates in all
other countries equaled that in the United States and all firms could
utilize foreign tax credits in full, then the net foreign tax effect in our
table would equal zero. If foreign countries levied taxes at rates below
the domestic rate, the foreign tax effect would be positive because the
domestic taxes on foreign source income would exceed the foreign tax
credit. The net effect of foreign tax provisions is a small increase in the
average tax rate, with relatively little change between the early 1980s and
the most recent years.
The sixth and seventh columns of Table 7 indicate the influence of two
other factors, tax progressivity and retabulations, on the average tax
rate. Tax progressivity, which accounts for the fact that some corporate
income is taxed at rates below the statutory maximum, lowered the
average tax rate by roughly 4 percent in the years preceding the 1986 Tax
Reform Act. The progressivity effect became much smaller in 1988, with
effectively no reduction in the average tax rate. This pattern deserves
further exploration, but it could be a result of the previously noted shift
from C to S corporations. This shift may have occurred disproportion-
ately among small enterprises that previously may have faced marginal
tax rates below the statutory corporate rate.
The final category, for retabulations, typically raises the average corpo-
rate tax rate. This reflects the impact of audits. There is no substantial
change in the importance of this effect in the period since 1986.
Table 7 clearly suggests that the most important factor that historically
led average tax rates to fall below the statutory rate is capital recovery. In
the early 1980s, capital recovery provisions depressed the average tax
rate by 14% more than they did during the 1960s and by 13 percent more
than during the late 1970s. In large part because the 1986 Tax Reform Act
reduced the generosity of tax depreciation, capital recovery factors today
have a much smaller effect in reducing the effective average tax rate.
The most obvious conclusion from Table 7 is that the average effective
tax rate has been closer to the statutory maximum rate in the post-1986
period than in any earlier time. In 1988, the average effective rate was
less than 4 percent lower than the statutory rate, compared with a differ-
ence of more than 20% in 1985. These statistics confirm our earlier conclu-
sion that the shortfall in corporate taxes since 1986 is not the result of
differences between the projected and actual effective rate, but rather
due to factors that have reduced the amount of corporate profits avail-
able for corporate taxation.The Tax Reform Act of 198657
V. CONCLUSIONS
Corporate tax receipts during the last five years have fallen significantly
below projections that were made when the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was
enacted. These projections called for a substantial increase in corporate
taxes during the last half of the 1980s. Actual corporate tax receipts have
barely equalled the level projected in early 1986, before passage of the
tax reforms that were expected to increase revenues.
The most important factor in the corporate tax shortfall is lower-than-
expected corporate profits. The underperformance of corporate profits
can be attributed to three principal factors. First, the predicted rates of
corporate profits when the 1986 Tax Reform Act was enacted were high
by historical standards. The total returns on corporate capital in the U.S.
economy in the late 1980s were not as high as the pre-1986 forecasts
which underlay initial revenue projections. Second, as a share of corpo-
rate operating income or GNP, corporate interest payments were signifi-
cantly higher in the late 1980s than in the years leading up to the Tax
Reform Act. This reduced the corporate tax base, and may, in substantial
part, ultimately be attributable to the marginal incentive effects for debt
and equity finance provided in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Third, also
quite likely in reaction to recent tax changes, the last few years have seen
rapid growth in the income reported by Subchapter S corporations. This
income is taxed under the individual income tax. The rise of S corpora-
tions, therefore, has contributed to the erosion of the corporate income
tax.
The most important unsettled issue this paper raises is how to calcu-
late the net revenue effect of the various behavioral shifts described
herein. A decline in corporate profits that results from higher interest
payouts reduces corporate income tax revenues, but at the same time
may increase the tax collections from interest recipients. A similar shift
in the labeling of revenue occurs when enterprises choose to become
Subchapter S corporations. It is essential to net the decline in corporate
taxes against the increase in other taxes in evaluating the revenue ef-
fects. This requires a set of assumptions about the marginal recipients of
interest payments, and about the types of activity that are shifted be-
tween C and S corporate status. Further research is needed to provide
such models.
The experience of the last several years underscores the elasticity of
taxable income flows among different labels with different tax character-
istics. When the tax code places different burdens on debt and equity or
S and C corporate income, some taxpayers are likely to respond by
rechanneling their taxable income. The elasticity of such financial flows58Poterba
is far greater than the behavioral elasticities, say of labor supply or sav-
ing, because the real effects associated with financial relabeling are less
substantial than those with changing a factor such as labor supply.
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